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Abstract 
The paper discusses the issue of the value added tax control statement. The aim is to assess, based on an analysis of available 
information, this tax fraud control instrument and predict possible impact on tax entities belonging to the category of small and 
medium enterprises (SME), as well as effects on the revenue part of the national budget. Our results show that while this measure 
brings benefits to the tax authority, fairly-dealing entities experience burden, particularly because of sanctions. In relation to 
fraudsters the instrument is not likely to improve tax collection.  
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Of global importance, value added tax (VAT) has spread to more than 140 countries worldwide since its 
implementation into the French tax system in 1954. Its popularity gradually increased mainly due to it becoming a 
convenient tool for the taxation of international trade (Nerudová & David, 2008; Terra & Kajus, 2007). Neutrality is 
this tax’ main pillar; it is achieved when claiming input VAT. The payer is entitled to deduct at the moment when 
the transaction has been done and after the issuance of the invoice. The capability to generate significant amounts for 
the national budget is another positive aspect of VAT with about one fifth of all tax revenues being collected as part 
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of this tax globally (Borseli, 2011). This makes it possible to predict annual revenues in each country for the benefit 
of the Treasury (Ministry of Finance, 2013). If one restricts the selection of states to the European Union only, then 
it is possible to state that VAT is one of the best-harmonised taxes at all. Currently, value added tax is harmonised by 
Council Directive 2006/112/EC, which unifies the rules for applying the tax within the Member States of the 
European Union. 
The resistance against tax evasion is considered to be a strong characteristic of value added tax. European 
Commission itself estimates, however, that all EU Member States lose about EUR 190 billion annually (European 
Commission, 2013). Because this VAT gap cannot be ignored, every Member State seeks to find its own solutions to 
the issue although limitations apply for the proposals, resulting from Council Directive 2006/112/EC. In the event 
that the draft measure significantly deviates from the Directive, it can be made null and void by the European Court 
of Justice.  
Approval of the Quick Reaction Mechanism (Council Directive 2013/42/EU) can be regarded a ground-breaking 
milestone in this area. The scheme makes it possible to introduce a local reverse charge mechanism for problematic 
goods and services in terms of the tax. The mechanism is based on the same principles which work for intra-
Community transactions (trading between at least two EU Member States). The provider of the taxable supply issues 
an invoice without VAT. There is exemption and zero tax rate. The recipient of the taxable supply is required to pay 
tax on the same supply, i.e., paying output VAT. Because the principle of neutrality applies, the payer can 
simultaneously claim input VAT at the same moment (Pfeiffer & Semerád, 2013). 
The Quick Reaction Mechanism can however only be applied for the maximum of nine months; a list of accepted 
supplies is limited (Council Directive 2013/42 / EU). Any change must be approved throughout the European Union, 
because there is a risk of fraud moving to another state. While this can be seen as a victory for one state, it does not 
resolve the problem of Member States as a whole. 
VAT Control Statement (MF CR, 2015c) is the most recent solution to the VAT tax fraud in the Czech Republic 
(MF CR, 2015c). The instrument focuses on the very essence of the functioning of the tax since VAT is based on the 
principle of tax payer claims. The tax return indicates the payer's aggregate amount of individual items and the 
resulting tax liability. This may involve either tax liability as such or excess VAT. Excess VAT occurs when the 
level of input VAT exceeds that of output VAT. If the tax authority has no doubts about the legitimacy of the excess, 
then it returns the difference thus generated to the taxpayer within 30 days of filing the tax return (Semerád, 2014). 
Now the possibility to verify the tax payer claim can be denoted a weakness of VAT. In order to verify the facts 
stated in the tax return, the tax authority needs to check the tax payer physically. This makes a problem for cross 
checks. If there is a received VAT invoice, then another entity must exist by which the invoice was issued (output 
VAT). If the supplier (provider) was from a different region, then it needs locally competent staff of the tax authority 
to become involved in the check (Article 13, Tax Code). This is a demanding process in terms of administration and 
finances since under the Czech law a recipient of a taxable transaction can claim the deduction even after three years 
from the date of the taxable supply (Article 73, Section 3, Act on VAT).  
For the Czech tax authority to be able to check taxpayers in real time (i.e. on the date of filing a tax return), it can 
make use of the information made available to it as part of the VAT Control Statement. A specialised software 
application was developed that compares submitted data that all the taxpayers provide for the benefit of the tax 
authority (Financial Administration, 2015b). The program employs the above mentioned principle to evaluate the 
compliance and, if necessary, non-compliance of individual taxable supplies. It is a ground-breaking tool, the real 
impact of which can be evaluated only with some time delay. However, since space can occur for tax fraud or a 
problem may exist in the actual use of the software, we focused on this instrument from this point of view as well.  
2. Methodology and Data 
The aim of this paper is to assess, based on an analysis of available information, this tax fraud control instrument 
and predict possible impact on tax entities belonging to the category of small and medium enterprises (SME) as well 
as on the revenue part of the national budget. The authors also focused on technical parameters and selected 
elements of the tax administration. 
Methods and procedures used in the process of production of the paper are outlined below. Available information 
on control statements was studied by analysing; this particularly involved the legislation and implementing 
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regulations/ methodologies. Because this is not just an administrative measure – any violation is followed up by even 
killing sanctions, we evaluated its impact on tax entities as well as on the revenue part of the national budget. The 
evaluation can be viewed as a subjective analysis because it was a prediction without the possibility of working with 
data from the tax authorities. For the purposes of this paper, we used the current state t0 as the basis and the future 
state t1 as prediction. An evaluation scale was established: <+, 0, −>, wherein: 
the “+” means that introducing the control statement can be expected to improve the state t1 when compared with 
the current state t0. This condition can occur through e.g. reduced administrative burden, or improved accessibility 
and verifiability of the provided information between the taxpayer and the tax authority.  
The “−” indicates a negative change between the monitored periods. This condition can be achieved e.g. in the form 
of increased administrative burden, burdensome restrictions and legal uncertainty.  
If the condition remains unchanged, then it is rated using “0”. If it is necessary to distinguish a neutral change which 
still involves a potential of slight improvement, such a condition is rated using “0+”. On the other hand, if there is a 
slight deterioration, the result is marked “0−”.  
The general assessment is based on the overall frequency of partial evaluations per category. The prevailing 
symbol is then expressed on the same rating scale. Each of the evaluation, the selection of the parameters, and the 
view of the authors are explained at the particular symbols under “Results and discussion”. 
3. Results and Discussion 
Interestingly, the proposal of the measure did not met a wave of repulsion amongst taxpayers since their attention 
was focused on another instrument designed – Electronic records of sales (e.g. Financial Administration, 2015a). 
Adopted from Croatia on the basis of lessons learned, the measure was originally intended to be introduced at the 
turn of 2015 and 2016 (MF CR, 2015b). It is assumed to operate on the principle that at the very moment of 
payment, every cash receipt is recorded in the central data repository of the Financial Administration via the Internet 
(MF CR, 2015a). The introduction, however, has not yet occurred. Some businesses exhibited a lack of trust in the 
security of the system as well as in the method of handling the sensitive data received.  
While the control statement initially did not arise too much concern, question marks over the actual operation 
began to bubble up over time even in this regard. Now this is how control statements work: 
Only taxable persons registered for VAT are obliged to submit the VAT Control Statement (Articles 101c – 101i, 
Act on VAT). VAT Control Statement does not substitute a VAT return or a Recapitulative Statement for Intra-
community supplies. Data to fulling this obligation are collected based on issued and received tax documents. 
Simplified tax documents (in value lower than 10,000 CZK incl. VAT) are collected as well. The VAT Control 
Statement has to be submitted electronically. The VAT Control Statement has to be submitted electronically and 
there is not allowed any (temporary) exemption from this duty.  
Tax entities never mind the obligation of submitting data electronically. VAT returns are not possible to submit as 
hardcopy from 1 January 2016 onwards. Fear rather arises from the sanctions that cannot be waived (Article 2, 
Section 5, Tax Code) and arise from a breach of obligation. 
If a taxable person registered for VAT does not submit a VAT Control Statement within the due date, the 
following sanctions will be applied:  
a) 1 000 CZK, if the VAT Control Statement is submitted after the due date without summons from the Tax 
Administration,  
b) 10 000 CZK, if the VAT Control Statement is submitted within the deadline given by the Tax Administration in 
issued and delivered summons, 
 c) 30 000 CZK, if the Corrective VAT Control Statement is not submitted although summons to submit a Corrective 
VAT Control Statement were issued and delivered by the Tax Administration, 
d) 50 000 CZK, if the regular VAT Control Statement is not submitted nor is submitted after summons of the Tax 
Administration. 
Nevertheless, if a taxable person registered for VAT seriously violates or obstructs the administration of VAT by not 
submitting the VAT Control Statement, the tax administrator can impose a sanction up to 500,000 CZK depending 
on individual conditions (Financial Administration, 2015b). 
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These can be viewed as totally harmful measures because sanctioning is possible in relation with every tax return. 
At present it is not clear at all how the tax authority is to recover sanctions from missing traders. These participate in 
carousel fraud by failing to pay output VAT as the first entities in the Member State. Before filing a tax return, these 
entities end up insolvent. Therefore, the impact of sanctions was used as the first reference indicator. Splitting the 
companies into size groups made use of Commission Recommendation No. 2003/361/EC, which in 2003 introduced 
a uniform definition of small and medium-sized enterprises in the European Union. The recommendation became the 
basis for splitting businesses into groups per the following criteria:  
The category of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer 
than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet 
total not exceeding EUR 43 million.  
Within the SME category, a small enterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and 
whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 10 million. 
Within the SME category, a microenterprise is defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and 
whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 2 million. 
For the purposes of this paper it was not possible to determine whether fraudsters belong to SME or any size 
category. According to the authors, however, the entity size is not essential.  
The application of the liability for unpaid tax is the second indicator tracked. This measure has been gradually 
evolving since April 2011. The main principle is that the tax authority has the possibility to recover the unpaid tax 
from the recipient in the case the tax had not been paid by the provider of the taxable supply (Article 109, Act on 
VAT). Buyers, however, enjoy protection under the good faith (lack of awareness) principle; they are also protected 
by the European Court of Justice (Pfeiffer & Ursprung-Steindl, 2015). There is the right to deduct input VAT of a 
taxable person who carries out such transactions be affected by the fact that in the chain of supply of which those 
transactions form part another prior or subsequent transaction is vitiated by VAT fraud, without that taxable person 
knowing or having any means of knowing (ECJ Optigen Ltd (C-354/03)). 
In connection with the liability for unpaid tax we consider it appropriate to mention the principle of unreliable 
payer (compare Semerád, Radvan, Bartůňková, 2016). This third indicator is related to the liability for unpaid tax. If 
a taxpayer is denoted as an unreliable payer, the recipient of the taxable supply is liable for any possible unpaid tax. 
Ways to become an unreliable payer are several. The Act states in this regard: Should the payer commit a serious 
misconduct related to tax administration, the tax authority shall decide that the taxpayer is an unreliable payer 
(Article 106a, Act on VAT). So if an otherwise blameless payer repeatedly violates the duty in the form of control 
statement, it might have a major impact on its reputation since entities from which the tax authority recovers unpaid 
taxes become unreliable payers. 
The fourth indicator involves how the specialised tax authority’s software is to evaluate the submitted data. There 
may be concerns that the application will not be able to distinguish correct numbers of tax documents. Some 
accounting software applications use letters and special characters (e.g. dash) to number invoices, in addition to 
numerals. While provider’s invoice number will be correct at all times, problems may occur on the part of the 
recipient of the taxable transaction since if the entity selects only the numeric value from the tax document, there is a 
risk that the value is not matched with the provider’s data properly. At that moment the tax entity can be asked to 
make remedy and receive a sanction. Sanctions can be granted despite the fact that it is only a formal, not a 
substantive error that affects the amount of tax. 
The fifth indicator involves the fact that the software used by the tax authority may suffer technical difficulties. 
Our argument is based on the experience when there was the replacement of the software for the central register of 
vehicles in 2013. The program had been undergoing long-term problems that subsequently escalated by the 
application being replaced in full (CT 24, 2013). Another problem could be caused by data back-up issues. 
The sixth and the final indicator is the revenue for the Treasury. Here, it is likely that there will be a higher tax 
collection. However, estimating whether or not the control statement is to enable tax recovery from tax fraudsters is 
difficult. Other results may be affected by the fact that the entitlement to deduct may be applied within three years 
after the first entitlement to deduct (Article 73, Section 3, Act on VAT). The final result may influence not only 
future entitlements to deduct, but also claims incurred before 1 January 2016 since there is nothing to compare with 
these figures. Summary of these indicators can be found in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Evaluation of the control statement according to selected indicators. 
Selected indicator Microenterprises Small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises 
Tax fraudsters State Rating 
Sanctions − − 0 + − 
Liability for unpaid VAT 0 0 0 + 0 
Unreliable payer − − 0 + − 
Data match 0− 0− 0 0+ 0− 
Technical issues 0− 0− 0 0− 0− 
Tax payment 0 0 0 + + 
Final rating − 0− 0 + 0− 
 
The results achieved demonstrate that it is necessary to differentiate which of the observed groups of enterprises 
we evaluate. In the case of micro enterprises, sanctions were rated using the critical value “−” because (repeated) 
sanctions could destabilise the entity in financial terms. Sanctions are also rated using negative scoring in the case of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. If the responsible person is on leave or has serious health problems, it may 
happen that they do not manage to provide an explanation to the tax authority in case of discrepancies as part of 
control statement and receive sanctions while the time to provide an explanation is set to make five calendar days 
only. Fraudsters, in our opinion, are not jeopardised by the sanctions. Since these do not have enough funds to pay 
the tax due, or the recovery of the tax is impossible, then enforcing sanctions encounter the same problem. The State 
itself is the only entity to benefit from the existence of sanctions in that it obtains an effective instrument to handle 
taxpayers. Given that a sanction cannot be waived according to the Tax Code, one can expect that there is an inflow 
of money into the Treasury. Our overall assessment is “−”. In our opinion, sanctions should be graded in a different 
way. In particular, a possibility should exist of considering some relevant factors due to which the filed control 
statement had been challenged. If an entity is to be punished that submits the control statement on time and leaves, 
e.g. on vacation, and any doubt is discovered only subsequently and involves nothing but a number of a tax 
document, then it will not involve a tool against tax fraud. Such a case could form grounds to see the new measure as 
a tool of official harassment of fair-dealing entities. 
Liability for unpaid tax is the second indicator under monitoring. In our opinion, the measure is neutral in relation 
to the control statement, i.e. no new requirement arises for any of the taxpayers. It is only in relation to the State 
where one can assume control statements to bring improvements. The tax authority gets the information on who 
traded with a potential fraudster, only a month later. This is something that was not possible for tax authorities 
before, especially where the fraudster did not keep accounts and did not file tax returns. 
Like with sanctions, the unreliable payer principle may bring difficulties to a fair-dealing payer. In the event that 
the payer repeatedly fails to comply with a legal obligation, it can find itself on a list from which it can be deleted 
after one year at the earliest.  
Data matching is the riskiest point especially for the recipient of taxable supplies who claim the input VAT. 
Although the software should seek matches among at first glance non-conforming data, there is a danger that it will 
not be so. Examples of non-conforming data may include identification of the provider (e.g. 15/00012 or 
FV1500012) and that of the recipient of the taxable supply (e.g. 1500012). Rating this uncertainty therefore prefers 
using the “0” symbol in terms of taxpayers.  
Data matching is also related to the technical difficulties which may complicate the work of the data sender. A 
taxpayer has 25 calendar days to meet the obligation. In practice, however, this period is shorter especially for a 
taxpayer with multiple branches who wait for the collection of all the data to be used for making the tax return. The 
capacity of the data flow is also a question. If the line becomes overloaded, short outages may occur or even up to 
several days of downtime of the system. 
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Tax payment, as another of the indicators observed, is only a game with numbers. We would argue that for 
taxpayers there are no major changes to occur. Those who pay taxes will continue to pay them in future. Indeed, 
even control statements are not to force fraudsters to meet tax obligations. 
Control statement is something we evaluate with some reservations. We do not see the importance of this measure 
in relation to fraudsters. The group was rated “0” for all the indicators because we do not expect any major changes. 
For other payers, it is rather a negative impact, especially because the threat of sanctions for minor violations may 
have destroying effects. We understand, however, that in respect of the control statement vs. the State one can see 
some positives. The State has at least data which it can use to calculate tax liability of taxpayers. Until now, this 
information could be obtained only through (cross) checks, which was accompanied by high costs.  
Economic cost and expediency of this measure is something that we will not venture to evaluate because we do 
not have sufficient information on the costs of software development, training of tax authority staff members and 
other unspecified costs (January 2016). Also, it is too early to assess the benefits in the form of increased tax 
collection. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper’s subject was a new tool against tax fraud – VAT Control Statement, which takes effect as part of the 
Czech value added tax act from 1 January 2016. The statement allows the tax authority working with the data used 
by taxpayers to produce tax returns. This information is available to the office immediately once the statement is sent 
electronically. This was not possible before because the calculation of taxpayer’s liability was based on nothing but 
payer’s claim.  
The aim of this paper was to assess, based on an analysis of available information, this tax fraud control 
instrument and predict possible impact on tax entities belonging to the category of small and medium enterprises 
(SME) as well as on the revenue part of the national budget. The authors also focused on technical parameters and 
selected elements of the tax administration. 
A total of six indicators were determined and rated using the scale as follows: <−, 0−, 0, 0+, +>. They specifically 
involved sanctions resulting from violations, liability for unpaid tax, the unreliable payer principle, data matching, 
technical difficulties and the impact on tax payments. 
The results demonstrate that the authors do not see the importance of this action in relation to the fraudsters. From 
the authors’ viewpoint, those groups are not very probable to redress. Fraudsters cannot be assumed to suddenly 
begin to meet their tax obligations. The opposite is true – control statements seem to be dangerous instruments in 
relation to other payers. However, we see positive aspects for the State for which control statements are likely to pay 
off in the long run since it has the input data from all the taxpayers that they use for completing their tax returns. 
Previously, the information was possible to get only through physical checks of tax documents at the payer. The 
information available is not enough to assess the economic viability of this measure because we do not have 
sufficient information on the actual costs. Only the future will make it possible to evaluate the real effect 
(increase/decrease) of tax collections for the benefit of the national budget. 
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